Abstract and Keywords

Over the last twenty-five years or so, there has been a growing awareness among race and gender scholars that a fully adequate analysis of these two forms of societal oppression cannot be done in isolation from one another. That is, an understanding of racism and sexism is fundamentally incomplete without an appreciation of how race and gender intersect and interact with one another in the creation and maintenance of group-based hierarchy and oppression. This chapter argues that while intersectionalist and critical race theorists have qualitatively (and occasionally quantitatively) drawn attention to the fact that the racial and gender dimensions of oppression are both interactively implicated in the maintenance of group-based inequality, a fully satisfactory empirical analysis of the dynamics of racism and sexism has yet to be achieved. Using the theoretical frameworks of evolutionary psychology and social dominance theory (SDT), this chapter offers an alternative understanding of the intersectional entanglement of racism and sexism. This chapter introduces the theory of gendered prejudice, a derivative of SDT, and posits that a satisfactory account of racism, or what social dominance theorists generalize as “arbitrary-set” oppression, is a deeply gendered phenomenon.

Keywords: social dominance theory, intersectionality, sexism, racism, theory of gendered prejudice
The Theory of Gendered Prejudice: A Social Dominance and Intersectionalist Perspective

Even before Allport’s seminal work, *The Nature of Prejudice* in 1954 (see Allport 1979), the fields of social and political psychology investigated why individuals of certain social groups are targets of negative stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination across a broad variety of domains such as housing, the criminal justice system, the education system, the healthcare system and labor markets (for reviews, see, e.g., Pager and Shepherd 2008; Sidanius and Pratto 1999). The groups usually examined in these contexts include traditionally marginalized targets such as ethnic/racial and religious minorities, women, and the elderly. Recently, social and political psychologists have broadened their gaze to include groups such as sexual and national minorities, immigrants, the poor, and those with physical or mental disabilities. Beyond merely documenting the existence of these phenomena, social and political psychologists have focused on ameliorating the negative outcomes of marginalization and discrimination (e.g., Paluck and Green 2009), while social dominance theorists have endeavored to explore the manner in which both dominant and subordinate groups contribute to the creation and maintenance of group-based hierarchy and intergroup oppression (see also Jost and Banaji 1994).

As a result of a concentrated focus on intergroup relations and conflict, there is increasing knowledge of how prejudices such as racism and sexism operate as well as how being targets of such prejudices and discrimination alter individuals’ cognition, affect, behaviors, and life outcomes. However, when one takes a more critical look at social and political psychologists’ collective understanding of prejudice and discrimination, it becomes clear that this current understanding is based on the view that the characteristics of the targets of discrimination and prejudice are relatively secondary and that the essential features of the psychology of prejudice and discrimination are largely the same across targets. For example, this standard orientation leads to three general errors. First is the view that, for example, sexism is more or less a form of racism with women as the target of prejudice and discrimination instead of ethnic minorities. Second is the view that prejudice against high-status targets is the same beast as prejudice against low-status targets (see Bergh et al. 2016). Third, much previous research has tended to study various types of social identity in isolation from one another. For example, much of the work on racism has focused on the experiences of, and reactions toward, minority men, while the bulk of the research on sexism explicitly or implicitly uses white women as targets (see Reid 2002; Silverstein 2006). Although the experiences of minority men and white women might generalize to other subcategories of race and gender, to date there is scant empirical research systematically investigating how these social identities connect to influence expressions and interpretations of discrimination. Given that humans do not experience or perceive social groups in isolation but instead integrate all of the social information given to them, psychology needs to take these multiple identities into consideration when exploring how prejudices operate.

This is what scholars call “intersectionality,” or the “interconnected nature of social identities like race, gender, sexual orientation, and class as they apply to a given individual or group to create overlapping and interdependent systems of discrimination and oppression” (Crenshaw 1989). In recent years there has been an increasing number
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of psychologists urging scholars to incorporate intersectionality in the methods, theories, and practices of psychology (Cole 2009; Else-Quest and Hyde 2016; Parent, DeBlaere, and Moradi 2013; Williams and Fredrick 2015). Answering this challenge, theorists in psychology have started to tackle this question of how simultaneously considering multiple identities, and race and gender specifically, influences outcomes such as discrimination and prejudice. Although the intersectionality perspective acknowledges that social identities interact to influence the experience of discrimination (e.g., Crisp and Hewstone 2007), there is no consensus yet as to how precisely these social identities are thought to interact.

Current Intersectional Theories

Double jeopardy (DJ) is one of the oldest and most enduring intersectional theories and has its roots in sociological and the black feminist literatures of the 1970s (e.g., Beale 2008, see also King 1988). DJ’s strength lies in the simplicity of its assumptions: if a target of discrimination has two social identities that are marginalized, that target is then expected to experience more discrimination than targets that only have one marginalized identity, who in turn experience more discrimination than targets with no marginalized identities. As an example, the DJ hypothesis suggests that black women, compared to white women, black men, or white men, should experience the most discrimination because they have both a marginalized racial identity and a marginalized gender identity. White women and black men have one marginalized identity and thus should experience less discrimination than doubly handicapped black women but more than white men, who do not have any marginalized identities in this example.

Although DJ can easily be used to explain expressions of discrimination, it was developed as a theory to detail the experiences at the intersection of identities; and thus, much of the evidence in support of DJ is qualitative and experiential. For example, the best-known studies of DJ, done by Berdahl and Moore (2006), show that black women were the most likely to report experiencing the highest level of discrimination but not the ones most likely to actually be the targets of harassment.

Studies of health particularly support DJ but suffer from the same issue. In these studies, participants with double- or even triple-marginalized targets report worse outcomes on self-reported health (Cummings and Jackson 2008), disability likelihood (Warner and Brown 2011), and even self-reported mental health (Chappell and Havens 1980). Although self-reported health is correlated with actual health outcomes (Chandola and Jenkinson 2000), these findings overwhelmingly represent the subjective experiences of intersectional targets rather than objective evidence of actual discrimination directed at these intersectional targets.
In reviewing the literature, we found only one strong experimental example of DJ in expressions of discrimination, which is a study conducted by Rosette and Livingston (2012). Under situations of organizational failure, black women were seen as the least effective leaders compared to black men and white women. The authors theorized that black women were penalized more than the others because black women are not prototypical of leaders in terms of either race or gender and thus were judged to be doubly at fault when blame needed to be assigned.

Although DJ is one of the oldest intersectional theories, it is still a nascent empirical theory as much of its evidence is rhetorical or experiential. Scholars in multiple disciplines have waxed eloquently about the double burden of race and gender stigmatization, but there are very few experimental or audit studies in its support. In addition, when DJ is placed in conflict with other intersectional theories (see section The Theory of Gendered Prejudice: A Proposed Intersectional Alternative), it is not supported (see, e.g., Veenstra 2013). Furthermore, there are several findings within the intersectional literature that a DJ framework cannot explain, with the most damning being selective inhibition, or the process by which single stigmatized groups face more discrimination than the doubly stigmatized (Kang and Chasteen 2009; Pedulla 2014; Remedios et al. 2011).

Intersectional Invisibility

Intersectional invisibility (II) is a relatively new theory developed by Valerie Purdie-Vaughns and Eibach 2008. It focuses on how oppression operates in qualitatively, rather than quantitatively, different ways for those with single and multiple marginalized identities. II assumes that the traditional operations of racism and sexism are aimed at prototypical group members of the respective categories, and thus, targets who are deviant from the group norm face unique kinds of discrimination. Taking race and gender as an example, II claims that the prototypical group member of the category “black” is a black man (androcentrism; see Johnson et al. 2012; Thomas et al. 2014) and the prototypical member of the category “women” is a white woman (ethnocentrism; see Ghavami and Peplau 2013), leaving black women to be “intersectionally invisible” in terms of their race and gender (Sesko and Biernat 2010). II does not simply suggest that minority women are the targets of increased (DJ) or decreased (see section The Theory of Gendered Prejudice: A Proposed Intersectional Alternative) prejudice compared to minority men. Instead, it leaves its occupants uniquely challenged in the various systems of oppression and inequality due to their non-prototypical status. For example, there is some evidence showing that black women are not sanctioned as heavily for aggressive leadership behaviors in the way black men and white women are (Livingston, Rosette, and Washington 2012), and this might be because of differences in stereotypes between black and white women on agency and competence (Rosette et al. 2016). Black women are stereotyped as dominant and strong and thus do not violate (intersectional) gender norms when they act assertively in the workplace compared to white women.
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II has promise, but as the newest in the cluster of intersectional theories, it has the least amount of empirical support. II is also the most empirically intractable as there are very few guidelines helping us to make predictions as to exactly how, and the domains within which, minority women will be treated on the basis of their race and gender. There have been several studies showing that more stereotypical and prototypical group members receive heightened levels of discrimination (Blair, Judd, and Chapleau 2004), but again, those studies overwhelmingly use male stimuli or control for target gender. That is to say, no study has directly tested the assumption of whether prototypicality judgments of intersectional targets directly lead to predicted patterns in discrimination such that the more black women are seen as prototypical for their race the more racism they receive and the more black women are seen as prototypical for their gender the more sexism they receive. Researchers have tried to manipulate prototypicality and test its relationship with “invisibility,” and the results are still inconclusive (Sesko and Biernat 2010).

To our knowledge, no studies have explicitly tied group categorization or prototypicality judgments with intersectional discrimination or prejudice, which is the backbone of the theory of gendered prejudice.

The Theory of Gendered Prejudice: A Proposed Intersectional Alternative

The theory of gendered prejudice (TGP; McDonald, Navarrete, and Sidanius 2011) is the intersectional offspring of social dominance theory (SDT; Sidanius and Pratto 1999) and parental investment theory (Trivers 1971). Unlike rational choice theory, which attempts to explain the aggregate behavior of society as the sum of the rational choices made by individuals (e.g., Bicchieri 1993), SDT focuses on the interactions of multilevel processes which tend to produce, maintain, and reproduce systems of group-based social hierarchy. SDT posits that there are three distinct types of group-based hierarchies: a) an age system, where those individuals defined as adults have greater sociopolitical power than those defined as “minors”; b) patriarchy, where males have greater sociopolitical and military power than females; and c) arbitrary-set hierarchy. By the term “arbitrary-set,” SDT refers to socially constructed categories of social distinctions, such as tribes, clans, sects, religions, nationalities, races, ethnicities, social classes, sports teams, minimal groups, or any other arbitrarily defined intergroup distinctions that the human mind is capable of conjuring. Thus, SDT argues that systems of social discrimination and oppression (e.g., racism, sectarianism, tribalism) are simply special cases of the human predisposition to establish, maintain, and re-establish systems of group-based social hierarchy and inequality.

Critically important here, SDT argues that while there are certain surface similarities between patriarchy and arbitrary-set hierarchy, they are nonetheless qualitatively distinct systems of hierarchical social organization. There are at least four crucial differences
between the systems patriarchy and arbitrary-set hierarchy. First, the two major
categories within the patriarchal systems (i.e., males and females) are completely and
inextricably codependent upon one another for reproduction and survival. This
codependency does not generally exist with respect to arbitrary sets. For example,
African Americans are not inextricably dependent upon the presence of European
Americans, nor are Muslims inextricably codependent on Buddhists.

The second major distinction between patriarchy and arbitrary-set hierarchies concerns
the issue of context sensitivity. While the number and characteristics of arbitrary sets are
exquisitely context-dependent and historically situated, the basic distinction between
male and female tends to be a fundamental category of mind (e.g., Kurzban, Tooby, and
Cosmides 2001; Pietraszewski, Cosmides, and Tooby 2014). For example, across the
Americas what it means to be “black” and white has varied between cultures and
historical epochs (see, e.g., Ignatiev 2009).

Third, while the intensity and ferocity of patriarchy can vary quite dramatically across
social systems and historical periods, the presence of patriarchy appears to be a human
universal (Goldberg 1991). In contrast, with a few exceptions, hunter–gatherers tend not
to have arbitrary-set distinctions within the troupe (Boehm 2000; Bowles, Smith, and
Mulder 2010).

Finally, the foci of the patriarchal and arbitrary-set systems differ with respect to intent.
The patriarchal system is primarily a project of paternalism and control of the sexual and
social prerogatives of women rather than a project of misogyny, hostility, and aggression
(see also Jackman 1994). In contrast, SDT argues that arbitrary-set hierarchy is primarily
a project of usurpation, social predation, and, as elucidated by TGP, male versus male
aggression.

To summarize, one important implication of these distinctions between hierarchies based
on sex and those based on the arbitrary set is that we must avoid thinking of sexism as
simply a form of racism that just happens to be directed against women. Rather, it is a
distinctly different system of hierarchy designed to serve distinctly different purposes.

Building upon Darwin’s sexual selection theory (1871) and Trivers’ parental investment
theory (1971), TGP argues that many of the robust psychological and behavioral
differences between men and women have their roots in the differential reproductive
constraints, opportunities, and risks faced by the two sexes. Because of the design
features of mammalian reproduction, the costs and risks associated with reproduction are
substantially higher for females than they are for males. These relatively high costs
endured by females include the time and energy associated with fertilization, gestation,
and lactation, as well as the energy and the nontrivial mortality risks of childbirth. In
contrast, most mammalian males, including humans, have no physiological obligations in
reproduction after the relatively costless production of millions of sperm and the act of
fertilization. In addition, human males are reproductively viable for much longer periods
of their life cycles than are females. This fact, coupled with the fact of the lower reproductive costs, enables males to have a much higher limit on their levels of reproductive success than is the case for females (see also Fisher 1999).

Trivers (1971) argues that these differential reproductive costs and constraints faced by males and females had a number of subtle yet profound downstream consequences for the evolved psychologies and reproductive predispositions of males and females. These differential reproductive costs and constraints will induce males and females to optimize their reproductive success by adopting different reproductive strategies (see Bateman 1948; Buss 1989; Moss and Maner 2016). For females, given the high cost of reproduction, reproductive success is optimized by being relatively choosy in the selection of long-term mating partners. According to this perspective, human females have evolved a psychology biasing their long-term mate preferences to favor the selection of those males with relatively high social status, wealth, and power and who are perceived as being ready, willing, and able to employ these social resources to the care and benefit of the female’s offspring, and ultimately to female reproductive fitness (e.g., Kenrick and Manor 2005).

Among human males, in contrast, given that the reproductive costs and risks of each mating are rather minimal, reproductive success is optimized by gaining sexual access to as many females as possible, all else being equal. In addition, and more pertinently, the fact that females are biased in favor of high-status mates contributes to intrasexual competition among males over those social resources that females find attractive. Thus, across evolutionary time it has been reproductively beneficial for males to amass as many positive social resources (e.g., wealth, power, social status) as they are able and by whatever means seem relatively expedient. One of the means by which the accumulation of these social resources has been most expeditiously and safely achieved is the formation of arbitrary-set male coalitions for the extraction and expropriation of these social resources from other relatively resource-rich individual males and militarily weaker male coalitions. Not surprisingly, this resource expropriation often involved either violence or the threat of violence, designed to establish and maintain group-based social hierarchy (see Betzig 1993; Buss 1989; Wrangham and Peterson 1996).

Increasing one’s access to mates among males can involve physical coercion as well; thus, another way of ensuring male access to females is by controlling the rights and privileges of women. It is reasoned that the desire to gain relative power and status advantages over others will contribute not only to a male psychology predisposed to engage in dominance contests against coalitions of other males but also to an evolved male psychology biased in favor of male control of the social and sexual prerogatives of females. Thus, the central and unique claim of TGP is that the interplay between female and male reproductive strategies has resulted in downstream sociopolitical consequences and contributed to both the development of patriarchy—male control over the social and sexual prerogatives of females—and the establishment of arbitrary-set hierarchy among
males (see Figure 1). If the basic logic of the TGP is correct, then a number of empirically testable hypotheses follow.

Three Hypotheses Derivable from the TGP

There are at least three testable derivable from TGP: the invariance hypothesis, the male warrior hypothesis, and the subordinate male target hypothesis.

The Invariance Hypothesis

First and most obviously, if males have an evolved behavioral predisposition to engage in the coalitional expropriation and extraction of positive social value (food, territory, wealth, women, etc.) from individual males and male coalitions and to control the social and sexual prerogatives of females, then there is good reason to expect that these behavioral predispositions will be associated with an evolved male psychology supporting the domination of both women and arbitrarily defined sets of out-group males.

The tendency to support non-egalitarian and dominance-oriented group-based social organization is well captured by a self-report instrument entitled social dominance orientation (SDO; see Bratt, Sidanius, and Sheehy-Skeffington 2016; Ho et al. 2015; Kunst et al. 2017; Pratto et al. 1994; Sidanius and Pratto 1999). SDO is defined as the degree to which individuals favor and promote non-egalitarian and hierarchically structured group-based relationships regardless of the status of one’s in-group. Consistent with the expectations of SDT, SDO has been found to be strongly related to support for a long list of hierarchy-enhancing sociopolitical ideologies, group-based aggressions, and sociopolitical policies shown to facilitate increasing degrees of social inequality and group-based dominance of some groups over others.
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Given the logic of TGP, there is an expectation that males should exhibit higher levels of SDO than females. SDO reflects a competitive view of the world, and holding such views is more facilitative to the reproductive fitness of men compared to women. Furthermore, it is also expected that this gender difference will tend not to be moderated by social context, other things being equal (see Lee et al. 2011; Sidanius and Pratto 1999). This expectation has been labeled the “invariance hypothesis.” The invariance hypothesis is perhaps the most consistently validated proposition in the social dominance literature, with a multitude of studies showing a real and significant gender difference in SDO (e.g., Batalha, Reynolds, and Newbigin 2011; Caricati 2007; Dickins and Sergeant 2008; Foels and Reid 2010; Guimond et al. 2006; Mata, Ghavami, and Wittig 2010; Pula, McPherson, and Parks 2011; Schmitt and Wirth 2009; Sidanius and Pratto 1999; Sidanius, Pratto, and Bobo 1994; Sidanius, Pratto, and Brief 1995; Sidanius, Sinclair, and Pratto 2006; Snellman, Ekehammar, and Akrami 2009; Wilson and White 2010; Zakrisson 2008; see also Küpper and Zick 2011).

The most comprehensive test of the invariance hypothesis to date has been carried out by Lee et al.’s (2011) meta-analysis. These researchers compared the SDO levels of 25,081 men and 27,745 women across 206 samples and 22 different countries or geographic areas. The results were quite consistent and showed relatively large gender differences in SDO such that men scored significantly higher on SDO than women. Most striking, however, Lee and her colleagues also found that the effect sizes for gender differences in SDO tended to be stronger than those found for arbitrary-set distinctions in SDO. For example, Lee and her colleagues found that the effect size for gender was $d = 0.43$, while it was found to be only 0.15 for arbitrary-set differences.

The Male Warrior Hypothesis

In what has become known as the “male warrior hypothesis,” it is argued that not only will males have relatively high levels of SDO and a psychology more oriented toward intergroup inequality and dominance than is generally the case among females but they are also more likely to engage in higher levels of both interpersonal and intergroup violence and aggression, largely devoted to the establishment and maintenance of both interpersonal and intergroup status differences (Daly and Wilson 1994; McDonald, Navarrete, and Van Vugt 2012; Van Vugt 2009; Van Vugt, De Cremer, and Janssen 2007).

There is so much empirical evidence supportive of this hypothesis that its explicit enunciation is almost a cliché. For example, according to the 2013 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, males accounted for 96% of all homicides worldwide. Not only are males vastly overrepresented among the perpetrators of lethal violence but they are also disproportionately represented as organizers and front-line combatants in lethal, coalitional violence such as family feuds, gang wars, tribal wars, and international conflicts. While women often play supportive roles in intergroup conflict and warfare, as
However, while violence and the threat of violence are major factors in the establishment of group-based social hierarchy, SDT suggests that they are by no means the only ones by which group-based social hierarchy is maintained. Consistent with both classical elitism perspectives (e.g., Michels 1962; Mosca 1939; Pareto 1979), as well as more contemporary notions of social and ideological control (e.g., Gramsci 1971; Jackman 1994), group-based social hierarchy is also maintained by the use of non-violent social ideologies and social institutions (see Sidanius and Pratto 1999).
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The Subordinate Male Target Hypothesis

The subordinate male target hypothesis (SMTH) argues that, as part of a cluster of behaviors expressing male coalitional aggression, males will be not only the primary instigators of arbitrary-set discrimination and aggression (as outlined by the male warrior hypothesis) but also the primary targets of such intergroup discrimination and violence. For example, males accounted for 79% of all homicide victims worldwide (see United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2013).

To formalize the expectations of SMTH, let us define $\rho_{ASD,HE}$ as the correlation between any arbitrary-set distinction (ASD), such as a given race, tribe, ethnicity, or other socially constructed group distinction, and any hierarchy-enhancing (HE) social allocation. SMTH then makes the following claim:

$$\rho_{ASD,HE/male} > \rho_{ASD,HE/female} \geq 0$$

This is to say that the relationship between being a member of any arbitrary-set group and suffering an HE social allocation (e.g., blacks receiving the death penalty) or enjoying a hierarchy-attenuating social allocation (e.g., blacks getting a higher salary increase than whites) will be stronger for subordinate males than for subordinate females, which in turn might or might not be greater than zero. As an example, this implies that the white–black differences, or receiving HE social allocations based on race, will be greater between white and black men than between white and black women. We shall refer to this idea and the equation above which formally expresses it as the “SMTH inequality.”

However, before proceeding with this discussion, there are four issues in need of clarification as to what the SMTH inequality does not imply. First, SMTH is primarily concerned with targeted discrimination and aggression directed against members of an arbitrary set and by virtue of membership in that set. We argue that a female subordinate (e.g., an African American woman) might well suffer from the indirect effects of arbitrary-set discrimination and oppression but not the direct effects to the same degree as male subordinates. To the extent that African American women are dependent upon the relatively limited social resources available to black men in their relationship to her as husband, son, father, or other source of social support, compared to women from dominant arbitrary sets (e.g., white women), these indirect effects of discrimination will make daily life considerably more challenging for the average black woman than for the average white woman.

Second, we are not arguing that women will not perceive higher levels of generalized discrimination by, for example, being frequently and severely targeted by sexism, sexual harassment, and abuse. TGP posits that subordinate women are primarily discriminated against on the basis of their sex yet face less race-based discrimination than subordinate men. Attributional ambiguity for multiple-categorized targets (King 2003) might make parsing the sources of discrimination difficult, which is why TGP is based on objective and not subjective experiences of discrimination. However, SMTH is concerned with the
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intersection between arbitrary sets and gender. This is just to say that, and as argued by SDT (see Sidanius and Pratto 1999), biological sex is not simply another arbitrary set, nor is sexism just racism against women. Rather, patriarchy and arbitrary-set hierarchies are separate and distinct systems of social inequality, each with its own dynamics and social functions.

Third, it must be emphasized that the SMTH inequality does not imply that women from subordinate groups will never face targeted arbitrary-set discrimination. Rather, the argument is that to the extent that females do face such discrimination, the degree of this discrimination will be less severe than that discrimination confronting males.

Finally, previous articulations of TGP included an assumption that in-group men and women responded with increased discrimination toward out-group males, albeit for different reasons. Men were claimed to target out-group men for status and resources, while women targeted out-group men because of fear of sexual coercion (see McDonald et al. 2011). However, in light of the failure to replicate this basic differential motives hypothesis (see Hawkins, Fitzgerald, and Nosek 2015), we chose to remove this part of the theory (see also Salvatore et al. 2017).

Empirical Support for the SMTH

Because of the almost overwhelming amount of evidence in support of the invariance and male warrior hypotheses, we shall devote most of the remaining space in this chapter to reviewing the empirical evidence for the somewhat counterintuitive SMTH. In reviewing this empirical evidence, we recruit findings across different domains and research modalities.

Perceived Discrimination

There has been surprisingly little empirical research which has asked the simple question as to whether or not there are differences in the perceived levels of arbitrary-set discrimination as a function of gender. Although this is not at the heart of the SMTH (as the focus is primarily on objective discrimination), there are nevertheless observations that align with SMTH predictions, assuming some correspondence between perceived and objective discrimination. One of the few studies whose research structure allows such a question to be asked is the Levin et al. (2002) survey of University of California, Los Angeles, college students. Concentrating upon the results relevant for our discussion of SMTH, Levin and her colleagues asked Latino and black, male and female students the degree to which “I experience discrimination because of my ethnicity.” While their analyses failed to find support for DJ, and Levin et al. did not actually test the SMTH inequality for significance, the pattern of differences they found was quite consistent with the expectations of the SMTH inequality. This is to say that black males perceived greater
levels of personal discrimination due to ethnicity than did black females (i.e., M = 5.95 vs. M = 5.66) and Latino males perceived greater personal discrimination due to ethnicity than did Latino females (i.e., M = 4.89 vs. 4.49).

Similar results were found in the 1997 study of a nationally representative sample of 1,269 randomly selected African American men and women between the ages of 18 and 34 conducted by the Gallup organization.2 The informants were asked to indicate if they had experienced unfair treatment because of their race in at least one of five domains of daily life: 1) while shopping, 2) while dining out, 3) while at work, 4) with the police, and 5) while using public transportation. As can be seen in Figure 2, African American men reported perceiving substantially higher levels of racial discrimination across all five domains of daily life than did African American women.

Results consistent with the SMTH inequality are not just restricted to the case of African Americans but seem to generalize across culture and nationality as well. For example, in a large interview study of immigrants to Sweden carried out by the Swedish Immigration Ombudsman’s Office, the researchers asked whether immigrants from the four largest immigrant groups (i.e., Africans, Arabs, Asians, and Yugoslavs) had experienced racial discrimination in Sweden within the last five years. Analysis of the data showed that male immigrants from three of the four immigrant groups—excepting Asian immigrants—reported having perceived higher levels of racial discrimination than did female immigrants (see Lange 1996).

![Figure 2. Percentages of Black Men and Women Experiencing Unfair Treatment Because of Race as a Function of Domain](https://example.com/figure2.png)

*Source: Gallup Organization of Princeton (1997).*

Similarly, in an early study of housing discrimination against immigrants to Great Britain, there was a consistent trend across all immigrant groups studied (i.e., West Indians, African Asians, Indians, and Pakistanis/Bangladeshis). Without exception, males reported perceiving substantially higher levels of housing discrimination than females (see Smith 1976).

However, that subordinate males will subjectively experience higher levels of arbitrary-set discrimination than will subordinate females appears not to be entirely consistent with the empirical evidence. In a study of workplace harassment, Berdahl and Moore (2006) found empirical support for the DJ hypothesis which is inconsistent with the SMTH inequality.
While the interview and survey evidence showing higher levels of experienced arbitrary-set (e.g., racial) discrimination against males than against females is very suggestive, it by no means offers proof that sex-differentiated discrimination is actually taking place. There are any number of possible reasons why subordinate arbitrary-set males might feel more discriminated against due to their race or ethnicity than is the case for their arbitrary-set sisters. Among these alternatives might be the fact that males are more sensitive to ethnic/racial slights than are females (see, e.g., Daly and Wilson 1994) or that they do not suffer from attributional ambiguity as to the source of interpersonal and group-based mistreatment.

The Labor Market

Archival data are the next step up from self-reported, subjective assessments of discrimination and are somewhat less subject to the vagaries of misattribution. One rather direct manner of examining the plausibility of the SMTH inequality is to simply compare the average earnings of dominant and subordinant males and females over an extended period of time. One of the most recent and comprehensive comparisons of the salaries earned as a function of the interaction between race and gender is the work by Mandel and Semyonov (2016). These researchers traced the pay gap between black and white men and women over five decennial years between 1970 and 2010 (see Figure 3). As can be clearly seen in Figure 3, the pay gap between white men and black men was both substantial and quite stable over this 40-year period. In stark contrast, the pay gap between white and black women was quite small and essentially non-existent for the time interval 1980–2000. In other words, these salary data are quite consistent with the SMTH inequality.

However, it is still possible that the type of differences we are witnessing in Figure 3 might change substantially if we were to control for other variables as archival data make it difficult to draw any causal conclusions. For example, differences in human capital investment might account for these consistent differences as men tend to be more highly educated, on average, than women.
To explore this possibility, we interrogated a relatively unique study carried out by the sociologists Reynolds Farley and Walter Allen (1987) using data from the 1960 and 1980 censuses. These researchers calculated the rate of return in hourly wages for each additional year of college education the individual invested in, broken down by race and gender. The results in Figure 4 show that the rate of return in hourly wages for each additional year of college among white males exceeded that of black males in both 1960 and 1980 (i.e., 1960, $0.78 vs. $0.56; 1980, $0.96 vs. $0.69 in 1980). In contrast, among females, blacks received a slightly higher rate of return for each additional year of college education invested than did whites in 1960 (i.e., $0.62 vs. $0.59), while black women received a substantially higher rate of return for educational investment than did white women in 1980 (i.e., $0.79 vs. $0.64). It is also noteworthy that in both 1960 and 1980 black women actually enjoyed higher rates of return for educational investment than did black men (i.e., 1960, $0.62 vs. $0.59; 1980, $0.79 vs. $0.69, respectively). Thus, while these data are consistent with the conclusion that racial discrimination is operative with respect to black men, the data are not consistent with the notion of race-based discrimination against black women.

Analysis of the Bureau of Labor Statistics data from 2010 shows the same pattern as found in 1960 and 1980. The gap in the rate of return in hourly earnings for each additional year of post-secondary education invested was substantially greater between white and black men (i.e., $5.41 vs. $3.47) than between white women and black women (i.e., $3.50 vs. $3.15).

While one cannot prove that this particular race by gender interaction is due to targeted discrimination, it is nonetheless the specific pattern of interaction one would expect using the SMTH inequality (see Figure 5).
Yet another important set of archival data taken from the labor market and relevant to the SMTH inequality is the very comprehensive study of race and higher education in America conducted by William Bowen and Derek Bok (1998). These scholars followed roughly 45,000 enrollees in America’s elite public and private colleges and universities (e.g., University of California Berkeley, Harvard University) beginning in 1976. The students were recontacted in 1995.

Concentrating on the parts of this impressive work which are most pertinent for the arguments in this chapter, Bowen and Bok compared the average incomes of white and black, male and female former students in 1995. As can be seen in Figure 6, in 1995 dollars, there was a substantial gap in the average yearly income between white men and black men (i.e., $98,200 vs. $76,100). In contrast, there was only a modest gap in the annual incomes of white and black women (i.e., $64,100 vs. $60,900).

After controlling for a long array of possible confounding variables such as occupational category, whether or not advanced degrees were earned, academic performance, rank in class, precollege goals, personal differences in desire to earn money, precollege aspirations, a set of seventeen measures of aspirations, and a set of twenty-two self-ratings assessing factors such as leadership skills, stubbornness, physical attractiveness, and academic record, the gap in the yearly income between white and black women essentially evaporated (i.e., $64,000 vs. $63,700). In contrast to the minute salary difference between white and black women, the income gap between white and black men attenuated but was not eliminated (i.e., $98,000 vs. $89,500 respectively). While Bowen and Bok were hard pressed to come up with a convincing explanation for this mysterious interaction between race and gender found in their data, the data are consistent with what one would expect using TGP and the SMTH inequality.
randomized field experiments, such as employment audits. Audit studies (also known as correspondence studies) are among the most valid research methods available in the social sciences. Employment audit studies are those in which equally qualified members of dominant and subordinate groups possess equivalent resumés and where the only factor differentiating competing job applicants is their social category or social status. Sidanius and Pratto’s (1999) informal meta-analysis of the employment audit literature showed a clear tendency for dominants to be favored in the labor market over subordinates and for male subordinates to be particularly discriminated against.

One of the most comprehensive employment audits was carried out by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004). These researchers studied labor market discrimination by sending fictitious resumés to help-wanted ads in Chicago and Boston newspapers. Race of job applicant was manipulated by randomly sending in African American- or Euro American-sounding names in response to the employment ads. Not surprisingly, white-sounding names received 50% more callbacks for interviews than did African American-sounding names. More pertinent for our discussion of the SMTH inequality, when comparing racial differences in callbacks for sales positions, the researchers found that white women were 22% more likely to get a callback than black women. In contrast, white men were 52% more likely to get a callback than black men.

One of the more interesting employment audit studies examined racial/ethnic discrimination in the Swedish labor market conducted by Arai, Bursell, and Nekby (2008). These researchers used a two-stage audit procedure and examined whether or not otherwise equivalent job applicants, except for having Swedish-sounding versus Arab-sounding names, were equally likely to receive a callback to an employment application. In the first stage, employers were sent resumés of equal quality. Stage one showed that although the results of the Bowen and Bok study strongly suggest racial discrimination against African American men, these findings can still not compel the conclusion of racial bias in the labor market. This is due to the possibility that, despite their best efforts to control for all possible confounds, the data were still subject to omitted-variable bias. Truly compelling evidence of discrimination consistent with the SMTH inequality demands the use of controlled

![Figure 6. Actual and Adjusted Income as a Function of Race and Sex](source: Bowen and Bok (1998)).
those with Swedish-sounding names were approximately twice as likely to receive an employer callback than those with Arabic-sounding names. Of note, stage one showed approximately the same level of ethnic/racial discrimination against both the male and female Arabic-sounding names and thus no evidence of the SMTH inequality. At the second stage of the experiment, the researchers augmented the quality of the Arab resumes by adding two more years of job-relevant work experience than the Swedish resumés. Results of this change showed that discrimination against the overqualified Arab female applicant essentially disappeared. In contrast, the level of discrimination against the overqualified Arab male applicant actually increased such that the relatively underqualified Swedish male applicant was now approximately 2.7 times as likely to receive a callback from the employer than was the relatively overqualified Arab male applicant. The fact that evidence of the SMTH inequality did not appear until stage two of the experiment suggests that this highly qualified male Arab might have appeared quite threatening to prospective Swedish employers.

The Criminal Justice System

It is a well-documented and worldwide truism that members of subordinate groups tend to be arrested, arraigned, convicted, imprisoned, and killed by the criminal justice system at substantially higher rates than are members of dominant groups (e.g., Alexander 2012; Glaser 2014; Guerino, Harrison, and Sabol 2011; Morris 2014; Sidanius and Pratto 1999; Western 2006). However, the focal question for us here is not that members of subordinate groups are targeted by the criminal justice system at higher rates than are members of dominant groups but rather whether or not the pattern of disproportionate targeting is conditioned by gender in a manner consistent with the SMTH inequality. Guerino, Harrison, and Sabol (2011) examined the US Bureau of Justice Statistics data on imprisonment rates per 100,000 inhabitants, broken down by race and gender. As can be seen in Table 1, Latino and black females were imprisoned at 1.64 and 2.83 times the rate as were white females, respectively. However, among males, the contrast between whites versus Latinos and whites versus blacks was even more extreme (i.e., 2.75 and 6.71, respectively). In other words, there is a clear interaction between race and gender such that the correlation between race and likelihood of imprisonment is substantially higher for men than for women (see also Sidanius and Pratto 1999, Chapter 8). While one cannot facilely attribute these differential outcomes to the effects of racial discrimination per se, the pattern of racial and gender differences in Table 1 is clearly consistent with the expectations of the SMTH inequality.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Imprisonment Ratio</th>
<th>Females</th>
<th>Males</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Latino/white</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td>2.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Given the overwhelming archival evidence that ethnic minority men are disproportionately targeted by the criminal justice system in America, a number of social psychologists have set up “shoot/don’t shoot” computer simulations in an effort to explore the degree to which unarmed African Americans might actually be at greater risk of being shot by the police. Indeed, the experimental evidence has tended to show that unarmed black male targets are shot at higher rates than are unarmed white male targets (e.g., Amodio et al. 2004; Correll, Urland, and Ito 2006; Correll et al. 2002, 2007; Greenwald, Oakes, and Hoffman 2003; Payne 2001; Payne, Lambert, and Jacoby 2002; Plant and Peruche 2005). However, Plant, Goplen, and Kunstman (2011) were the first, and as far as we know, the only researchers to study simulated “shoot/don’t shoot” behavior as a function of the race and gender of the target (Figure 7).

In Plant et al.’s “shoot/don’t shoot” simulations, the respondent was required to make very quick judgments as to whether a suspect was carrying a gun or a harmless gadget such as a cell phone. If the suspect was carrying a gun, the participant was instructed to shoot; and if the suspect was carrying a harmless cell phone, the participant was instructed not to shoot. In this experimental setup, respondents could make two types of errors: they could either fail to shoot an armed suspect, or they could decide to shoot an unarmed suspect. Not surprisingly, unarmed black male suspects were substantially more likely to be shot than were unarmed white male suspects. In contrast, unarmed black female suspects were no more likely to be shot than unarmed white female suspects. These results were most consistent with the SMTH inequality.

Follow up studies (Correll et al. 2011) situate the distal cause of this bias to shoot black men as a function of perceived threat, which is again consistent with the SMTH inequality.
Spiteful Social Allocations

Moving away from the criminal justice system into interpersonal encounters, evidence for the SMTH inequality can be found in individuals’ support for social policies. In one experiment of spiteful allocations, Navarrete et al. (2010) informed a sample of university students that, because of a state budget crisis, ethnicity- and gender-oriented student organizations on campus would have their budgets cut. However, students could choose how the budget cuts would be allocated across student organizations. Participants could distribute monetary assessments equally, or they could choose from among a range of options that, at one extreme, minimized the cuts to the in-group but also minimized the cuts to the (mostly minority) out-group even more. At the other extreme, participants could make a choice which would maximize the assessment to the out-group but at the cost of maximizing the assessment from the in-group as well. This latter response was regarded as a spitefully negative social allocation because it entailed a greater absolute cost to the in-group for the benefit of assessing an even larger relative cost to the out-group.

In this situation, the TGP would predict that spiteful allocations are most likely to occur when males allocate assessments to male-oriented out-group organizations but not when males allocate assessments to female-oriented organizations, regardless of whether or not they belong to the ethnic out-group or in-group (see McDonald, Navarrete, and Sidanius 2011). Furthermore, it was expected that females would not discriminate on the basis of either gender or race and regardless of in-group or out-group status. In other words, we expected to find evidence of an interaction such that spiteful allocations to ethnic out-groups would only tend to occur when males were making allocations to coalitions of out-group males. Inspection of Figure 8 shows that this is precisely the interaction pattern found.

![Figure 7. Percentage of Errors for Trials with Black and White Male and Female Targets as a Function of Object (Study 2)](source: Plant, Goplen, and Kunstman (2011))
Prepared Fear Paradigm

While these data suggest that males are particularly likely to engage in spiteful allocations, or aggression, against out-group males, there is good reason to believe that males will be perceived as potentially dangerous by both males and females and that this latent fear of males has roots spanning over evolutionary time. Furthermore, the early environment humans inhabited has induced us to classify the animate world into two broad categories, the category of creatures that we should fear and avoid, such as venomous snakes and poisonous spiders, and the category of creatures that we should not fear, such as ducks and butterflies. Researchers have used this evolved bias paradigm and shown that when one pairs threatening and non-threatening stimuli with an electric shock, humans are much faster at acquiring a conditioned response to the threatening stimuli over the non-threatening stimuli. Furthermore, once these conditioned responses are reliably acquired, conditioned responses to threatening stimuli are difficult to extinguish even when they are no longer associated with the unconditioned stimuli (Öhman and Mineka 2001).

Olsson et al. (2005) followed up on this prepared fear paradigm and applied it to the domain of intergroup relations. Using samples of black and white male faces as targets, these researchers found that racial out-groups were more readily and persistently associated with aversive stimuli than were racial in-groups. However, one important limitation of the Olsson et al. study was the exclusive use of male faces as targets. The SMTH inequality of the TGP would expect that while out-group male faces would be easily and persistently associated with aversive stimuli and danger, this would not be the case for either in-group male faces or female faces, regardless of in-group or out-group status. Navarrete et al. (2009) found this pattern, instead of a main effect of group membership. Aversive conditioning for black female faces was easily extinguished compared to fear extinction to black male faces. Furthermore, these effects were found when using both white and black respondents (see Figure 9). Thus, a caveat here is that conditioned fear may be less contingent on group inequality and more dependent on the person’s group membership compared to discrimination in, for example, the labor market and the criminal justice system.
Summary, Conclusions, and Unfinished Business

In this chapter we have introduced a theoretical outline for the TGP and reviewed the empirical support for it. In broad terms, the TGP simply posits that one cannot fully comprehend the dynamics and nature of arbitrary-set discrimination and oppression (e.g., racism, sectarianism, nationalism, tribalism) unless one apprehends arbitrary-set oppression as a deeply gendered phenomenon. There are three hypotheses implied by this foundational assertion. First, consistent with the Invariance Hypothesis, the preponderance of empirical evidence seems to support the idea that human males are more supportive of group-based dominance and inequality than are human females. Second, and in line with male warrior hypothesis, males are also found to be vastly overrepresented among the organizers and perpetrators of both interpersonal and intergroup aggression and oppression. Third, as articulated in the SMTH inequality, males are not only the disproportionate perpetrators of interpersonal and intergroup violence and acts of domination but also the primary targets of this discrimination, violence, and acts of subjugation.

While classic intersectionalist approaches (e.g., DJ) and the TGP share the basic assumption that gender and race are organically and deeply intertwined with one another, the two theories differ in at least three fundamental ways.

First, and perhaps most importantly, while we think it is defensible to define the TGP as an intersectionalist approach to the study of race and gender, by the term “intersectionalism” TGP simply refers to a statistical interaction, making exploration of
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the TGP methodologically tractable and relatively straightforward. With the exception of the DJ hypothesis, this methodological tractability is less true across the several different framings of intersectionalism, as broadly understood (e.g., see Crenshaw 1989).

Second, for the TGP not only should we find a statistical interaction between race and gender but this interaction is predicted to take a specific form, that form being that targeted arbitrary-set discrimination against males should be substantially greater than that targeted against females.

Third, unlike the traditional intersectionalist approaches, the TGP is theoretically grounded in the foundational assumptions of evolutionary psychology (e.g., Barkow, Cosmides, and Tooby 1995; Boyd and Richerson 1988; Kurzban, Tooby, and Cosmides 2001; Trivers 1971) and SDT (Sidanius and Pratto 1999). Altogether, our focused review of the research literature attests to a reasonably high, but not absolute, degree of correspondence between the TGP’s derived hypotheses and the empirical data.

This predictive success notwithstanding, there are six reasons to treat our conclusions with a certain degree of circumspection. First, despite the relatively broad array of substantive domains within which the TGP and SMTH appear to hold, this array is not exhaustive. For example, there are theoretical reasons to expect that the SMTH inequality should also apply to the quality of care one receives within the healthcare system. However, as far as we know, researchers have yet to explore this issue in any systematic fashion, and it remains a potentially fruitful target for further study.

Second, it is crucial to remember that the domains within which the SMTH inequality is posited to hold are restricted to arbitrary-set distinctions and do not generalize to the domain of patriarchy as expressed by sexism or sexual abuse. Social dominance theorists have long argued that patriarchy is not simply a form of racism against women but constitutes a separate and distinct system of social inequality, despite the fact that support for both arbitrary-set hierarchy and patriarchy is strongly associated with SDO (see, e.g., Ho et al. 2015; Kunst et al. 2017; Sidanius et al. 2016; also Sidanius and Pratto 1999). Thus, it is possible that minority women face a quantitatively and qualitatively different form of sexism from white women (see Buchanan and Ormerod 2002; Cuddy and Wolf 2013; McMahon and Kahn 2016), but this has not been the focus of this chapter.

Third, we are not yet sure of how to classify nonstandard sexual orientations and sexual prejudice. For example, is sexual prejudice against gay men a form of sexism or simply another case of arbitrary-set discrimination? This is a powerful question as discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity is a complex phenomenon, based on, among other things, expectations about gender roles and patriarchy but also gender presentation, concerns about health and safety, and morality in general. This assessment is too varied for the scope of this chapter, but further study is pertinent to understand how sexuality-based hierarchies function in society.
If, however, we simply consider gay men and lesbian women as examples of arbitrary sets, then there is evidence of TGP patterns in domains such as hate crimes. We examined the number of hate crimes targeted at gays registered with the US Department of Justice, Hate Crimes Statistics Office for 2015 (see Federal Bureau of Investigation 2015). Of the 800 reported hate crimes against gays reported that year, 83% were directed against gay men, while only 17% were directed against lesbian women.

Fourth, thus far the theorizing about the SMTH has just dealt with the intersection between two dimensions of social hierarchy, patriarchy and one dimension of arbitrary set (primarily defined by race or ethnicity). Naturally, a truly comprehensive examination of the SMTH should also try to examine the interactions between gender and multiply salient arbitrary-set distinctions simultaneously.

Fifth, while the bulk of the empirical evidence has supported the SMTH inequality, as we recall in a study of workplace harassment, Berdahl and Moore (2006) found evidence consistent with the DJ hypothesis rather than with the SMTH inequality (see also Livingston, Rosette, and Washington 2012). These somewhat conflicting results suggest that there are limiting conditions on both hypotheses which are yet to be identified. It is our hope that continued research on this question will help to resolve this inconsistency so that our understanding of the dynamics of group-based social hierarchy and discrimination can be widened and deepened.

Sixth, and finally, there is the question of how to most fruitfully conceptualize what is actually driving the various forms of prejudice and discrimination we have reviewed in this chapter. Are this prejudice and its various forms of differential social allocations (e.g., hate crimes, discriminatory hiring practices) simply manifestations of traditionally conceived and largely symmetric in-group versus out-group dynamics so dominant within the social sciences or asymmetrical and downwardly directed negative social allocations within hierarchically structured social systems, as argued by Bergh et al. (2016)? We suspect that the debate concerning this question is just about to get started.

Be that as it may, we submit that developing a methodologically tractable intersectionalist perspective on prejudice, racism, and discrimination is crucial in order for us to make meaningful progress in deepening and broadening our understanding of the seemingly interminable challenge of intergroup oppression and never-ending bloodshed. We hope that this chapter will be a modest contribution to these efforts.

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Notes:

(1.) By the term “hierarchy-enhancing” (HE), SDT refers to any ideology or social practice having the effect of increasing the degree of group-based social inequality. HE forces stand in opposition to hierarchy-attenuating forces, which have the effect of increasing the degree of group-based social *equality*. For more thorough discussion, see Sidanius and Pratto (1999).

(2.) With only one exception, the same pattern of perceived discrimination as a function of gender was also observed in the 34+ age range.

(3.) Note that Figure 5 was calculated by the research team using data from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics.

(4.) However, it is also noteworthy that armed white women seemed to be cut more slack than were armed black women as participants in this study were much less likely to shoot an armed white woman than they were to shoot an armed black woman. However, it was still nonetheless the case that armed black males were the most likely to be shot of all of the race-by-gender combinations.

(5.) However, the fact that extinction bias was found for both white and black respondents suggests that this extinction bias might be targeted at out-group males in general and is not restricted to subordinate males.

Jim Sidanius
Jim Sidanius, Harvard University

Sa-Kiera T. J. Hudson
Sa-Kiera T. J. Hudson, Harvard University
The Theory of Gendered Prejudice: A Social Dominance and Intersectionalist Perspective

Gregory Davis
Gregory Davis, Harvard University

Robin Bergh
Robin Bergh, Harvard University